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CASE NOTES
ANTITRUST-FRANCHISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MANU-
FACTURER AND DISTRIBUTORS-CONCERTED ACTION
TO ENFORCE HELD A PER SE VIOLATION OF
SHERMAN ACT
Defendant, General Motors, marketed its Chevrolet automobiles in the
Los Angeles area through franchised dealers. Each franchise agreement
contained a "location clause," which prohibited the dealer inter alia from
establishing branch sales offices without the prior written approval of
General Motors. Beginning in the late 1950's, a minority of the dealers
began to violate the terms of the location clauses by supplying discount
houses with new Chevrolets to be sold to the public. Following protests
from the three defendant Associations of Chevrolet Dealers, General Mo-
tors obtained agreements from each dealer to abandon the activities in
question. The associations then jointly undertook to police the agreements
and General Motors used the information obtained through the associa-
tions' surveillance to confront recalcitrant dealers and force them to capit-
ulate. In 1964 the United States commenced an action in the district
court to enjoin defendants from conspiring and combining to effect an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Relief was refused on the grounds that
the Government had failed to prove a conspiracy and that General Motors
had acted legally to protect its dealer organization.' Direct appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States under section 2 of the
Expediting Act.2 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for appro-
priate equitable relief finding that a classic conspiracy in restraint of trade
did in fact exist. The Court bottomed its decision on the elimination of
a class of competitors from access to the market and the deprivations of
franchised dealers' freedom to deal through discounters. No determination
was made as to the validity or economic desirability of the location
clauses; the Court holding that the joint collaborative action of the de-
' United States v. General Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964). It is of
interest to note that the Government first proceeded criminally. The defendants were
found not guilty. United States v. General Motors Corp., 216 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Cal.
1963).
2 The statute provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a district court's
final decision in civil antitrust suits in which the plaintiff is the Government. 32 STAT.
823 (1903), 15 U.S.C. S 29 (1964). For arguments supporting and criticizing the Act
see Cellar, Case in Support of Application of the Expediting Act to Antitrust Suits,
14 DEPAUL L. REv. 29 (1964) and Comment, 13 DEPAuL L. REV. 261 (1964), re-
spectively.
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fendants was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.8 United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
The purpose of this case note is to analyze the Supreme Court's reason-
ing and ascertain to what extent it has restricted the means by which a
manufacturer or producer may attempt to secure adherence to lawful
restrictions placed upon the distributors of its product. The significance
of the Court's decision lies not in the fact that defendant General Motors
is the largest manufacturing corporation in the United States, but in the
possibility and probability of its being used as precedent in future cases
involving similar distribution and market structures.4 A great number of
consumer products are marketed through similar systems of selective
distribution in order to achieve maximum sales volume.8
The Supreme Court in holding the activities of the defendants as un-
lawful per se has significantly expanded the scope of per se violations of
the Sherman Act. Before the prospective effect of the Court's ruling on
restrictive marketing and the property of its decision can be determined,
it is necessary to review the judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act,
including the application of the marketing terms "vertical" and "hori-
zontal" to resale price maintenance, group boycotts and selective distri-
bution.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. . . ." The statute has been judicially interpreted to
mean that only "unreasonable" restraints of trade are illegal., In Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States7 the Supreme Court said:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
Court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The his-
tory of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
3 26 STAT. 209 (1937), 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1964).
4 The Supreme Court rejected a plea by numerous manufacturers who appeared as
Amici Curiae to treat the automobile industry as sui generis and limit the scope of the
decision to the specific realities of the industry.
5 Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795 (1962). Relatively expensive goods for which con-
sumers will shop around and compare prices and defer purchases are usually marketed
through selective channels of distribution viz. exclusive franchises, franchises with
territorial restrictions, and franchises with customer restrictions, as opposed to in-
tensive distribution to achieve maximum sales volume.
6 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
7 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts.8
However some conduct has been declared to be illegal per se without
regard to its reasonableness.9 As stated in Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United
States:'0
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.11
Resale price maintenance unquestionably constitutes a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. The term "vertical" as used in marketing refers to the
channel of distribution through which goods flow from the manufacturer
to the ultimate consumer. Goods can be sold directly to the ultimate
purchaser, but more commonly they will be handled by one or more
intermediaries, such as a retailer or a wholesaler.12 In vertical resale price
maintenance situations a manufacturer will typically try to induce its
wholesale and retail distributors to buy and resell its product in accord-
ance with a published price list. The producer will also attempt to prevent
its distributors from purchasing from and selling to other distributors who
do not follow the producer's price maintenance policy.
It was first held that written agreements obligating distributors to resell
at fixed prices were invalid and unenforceable by a manufacturer, because
such undertakings obviously restrained trade and destroyed retail com-
petition. 8 In United States v. Colgate & Co.14 the Court granted that a
manufacturer having announced a price maintenance policy, may bring
about adherence to it by refusing to deal with customers who do not
observe that policy. But a refusal to deal in the future does not mean that
a manufacturer can secure adherence through an implied agreement, thus
defendent could not after its investigators discovered a violation of its
price list suspend the recalcitrant merchant's source of supply until an
8 ld. at 238.
9 The pursuant discussion of per se violations is not intended to be exhaustive but is
limited to those cases cited by the Supreme Court in support of its opinion. See gen-
erally, Bloom, A Guide to Antitrust, 20 Bus. LAW. 61 (1964); Gottlieb, The Tentative
Commandments of Antitrust, 8 PRAc. LAW. 91 (Dec. 1962); and von Kalinowski, The
Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Pbilosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 569
(1964).
10 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
11 Id. at 5. In the case at bar the Court said: "We need not inquire into the economic
motivation underlying their conduct." 384 U.S. at 146.
12See ALEXANDER, SURFACE AND ALDERSON, MARKETING (3d ed. 1953); CLEwETT,
MARKETING CHANNELS (1954).
18 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
14 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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adequate assurance of future obedience was received. Such an arrange-
ment, an implied in fact agreement, to maintain resale prices is as invalid
and injurious to the public interest as an express agreement. 15 The case of
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.16 further limited the
scope of lawful activity that can be taken by a supplier to obtain adher-
ence to its price list. There the defendant had enlisted the assistance of its
wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers in detecting price cutters to assure
compliance with its price policy. It was held that an agreement is not
necessary to establish an illegal conspiracy, if such co-operation exists by
which the natural flow of commerce and freedom of competition is natu-
rally restrained. 17 The doctrine of. the invalidity of vertical resale price
maintenance reached its present bounds in United States v. Parke, Davis
&# Co.18 where the Court pronounced the area of permissible conduct:
It must be admitted that a seller's announcement that he will not deal with
customers who do not observe his policy may tend to engender confidence
in each customer that if he complies his competitors will also. But if a manu-
facturer is unwilling to rely on individual self-interest to bring about general
voluntary acquiescence which has the collateral effect of eliminating price
competition, and takes affirmative action to achieve uniform adherence by
inducing each customer to adhere to avoid such price competition, the cus-
tomers' acquiescence is not then a matter of individual free choice prompted
alone by desirability of the product. The product then comes packed in a
competition-free wrapping-a valuable feature in itself-by the virtue of
concerted action induced by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is thus the
organizer of a price-maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Act.19
Thus it can be said that a pre-announced price maintenance policy
coupled with a practice of discontinuing sales to violators is legal, but the
potentiality of a violation is multiplied once the supplier engages in more
than mere customer selection. Distributors cannot be engaged in a pro-
gram to promote general compliance, dealings cannot be suspended until
adequate assurance of future compliance is received, nor can a supplier
terminate dealings and then give the violator a second chance by resuming
dealings under probation.20
1' Accord, United States v. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 52 U.S. 85 (1920); and Fry & Son
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921), in which it was held that the dealers co-
operation by merely following the manufacturer's price list did not amount to an im-
plied agreement to maintain resale prices.
16 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
17 Accord, United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), where-
in only wholesale price maintenance was attempted.
Is 362 U.S. 29 (1960). '1d. at 46-47.
20 The supplier cannot indirectly coerce compliance by consigning his goods, rather
than selling to its retailer-sublessee, Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
See generally Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 165 (1964).
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The word "horizontal" as applied to marketing relates to those, as a
group, who are at the same level in a channel of distribution. It may be
used in connection with the wholesalers of a class of merchandise or it
may concern the producers or consumers of a commodity. 21 Horizontal
conspiracies to fix or maintain prices consisting of concerted activity by
competitors at the same level of distribution are also illegal per se.
22
In the case at bar it should be recalled that the Court proceeded on
the basis of a per se violation without concerning itself with the legality
of the location clause. Furthermore no inquiry was made into the lawful-
ness of the unilateral enforcement of the location clause assuming argu-
endo its validity. The Court reasoned:
Exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or conspiracy
is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the Sherman
Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the col-
laborators' profit margins or their system for distributing automobiles ... 23
In applying this rationale the Court relied on Fashion Originators'
Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n24 and Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 25 Both involved group boycotts or concerted
refusals by traders not to deal with their competitors. Such horizontal
arrangements involving competitors have long been forbidden and deemed
per se violations of the Sherman Act. In the former case members of an
association of women's garments manufacturers agreed not to sell their
goods unless the buyer agreed not to use or deal in goods which were
copied by non association members from the designs of the members of the
association. The Supreme Court ruled that if the object of the agreement,
i.e. boycott of certain competitors, was unlawful, the reasonableness of the
method of enforcement and the fact that prices were lowered were im-
material. Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores26 involved a conspiracy of
a retail department store chain and distributors and manufacturers of
household appliances not to sell appliances to plaintiff or to sell to it at
discriminatory prices and at highly unfavorable terms. The combination
was held to be of a monopolistic nature and character and therefore for-
bidden even if allegedly reasonable in the specific circumstances and
innocuous to prices.
In White Motor Co. v. United States27 the Court for the first time
examined the validity of territorial restrictions in a vertical arrangement.
21Supra note 12.
22 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), wherein gasoline
companies combined to purchase the excess production of independent refiners there-
by increasing their contract prices, which were based upon current market prices.
23 384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966). 24 312 U.S. 457 (1949).
25 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 26 Ibid. 27 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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Here the defendant, a manufacturer of trucks and truck parts, marketed
its products in part through a system of distributors who were limited to
specified geographic areas in which they could sell, as well as being pro-
hibited from vending their stock to certain classes of purchasers, such as
governmental agencies and fleet accounts. The Supreme Court held that
the illegality of such arrangements could not be tested with a motion for
a summary judgment and that their reasonableness should be determined
in a trial. The rule that horizontally imposed territorial restrictions are
per se violative of the antitrust laws was not extended to vertical arrange-
ments. Instead the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman Act required
the application of the rule of reason and therefore an inquiry into the
facts particular to the business to which the restraint was applied. Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion stated that although territorial
restrictions might have the same effect on intra-brand competition as re-
sale price maintenance, they can be justified by a demonstration of a
salutary effect on inter-brand competition.
It is interesting to contrast the system of distribution employed by
White Motor Co. with that of General Motors. In the noted case the
relationship between the manufacturer and its individual dealers was in-
corporated in a comprehensive uniform Dealer Selling Agreement, which
did not restrict or define to whom the dealer could sell, nor did it limit
the territory within which the dealer could sell. It can be seen that White's
dealers were restrained to a much greater degree than those of General
Motors. The relative autonomy enjoyed by the Chevrolet Dealers was
conducive to the vigorous price competition that existed among them.
Judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act had established the illegality
of horizontal boycotts and resale price maintenance-both horizontal and
vertical. As per se violations of the Sherman Act, they cannot be eco-
nomically justified and any contract, combination or conspiracy to effec-
tuate one is unlawful. Conversely, the possibility of economic justification
and reasonableness has been recognized in the situation of vertically
imposed restrictions. However the instant case involved a vertical restric-
tion enforced by a method conclusively held to be unlawful when used
to effectuate horizontal boycotts and resale price maintenance. The goals
of resale price maintenance and horizontal boycotts are illegal, not concert
of action. Therefore, although it is illegal per se to use concerted activity
to achieve a prohibited goal, it does not inexorably follow that when
similar concerted activity is used to attain a lawful goal a per se violation
of the Sherman Act must follow, as the Court held.
It should be plain why there is a real danger of the abuse of the per se prin-
ciple by those predisposed to offer mechanical or dogmatic solutions to legal
problems. In every antitrust case there are two routes to a finding of illegality:
202 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
critically analyzing the competitive effects and possible justifications of the
challenged practice; or subsuming it under one of the per se rules. The latter
route is naturally the more tempting; it is easier to classify a practice in a
forbidden category than to demonstrate from the ground up, as it were, why
it is against public policy, and should be forbidden. It is wholly improper,
however, to dispose of an antitrust case by invoking a per se rule unless the
challenged practice really fits the policy and rationale of the rule. If the rule
must be stretched, or its language wrenched from context, to include the
practice under it, the result will be to outlaw a business practice without any
analysis of, or practical experience with, its actual competitive effects and
possible economic justification. 28
Although vertically imposed restrictions have not themselves been de-
clared to be of such a pernicious effect as to be without redeeming virtue,
any attempt to enforce them in a manner similar to that previously em-
ployed for resale price maintenance might prove to be not only nugatory,
but illegal as well. A full application of the per se rule would leave ver-
tical restrictions totally enervated. A manufacturer could merely an-
nounce his scheme for restricted distribution and then hope that its
individual dealers would voluntarily comply and that overzealous sup-
porters of the plan would not engage in enforcement or investigative
activities to encourage dissenters to co-operate. Noncompliance could be
punishable only by the cancellation of a franchise or dealership, a very
expensive price for both parties to pay.
In the present case it is evident that the Supreme Court rejected many
strong economic arguments in favor of the defendants' activities.29 The
district court stated that a denial of General Motors' right to set standards
for its dealers on the theory of an unreasonable restraint on trade would
28 Remarks by Federal Trade Commissioner Philip Elman before the First Annual
Antitrust Institute in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 5, 1965 in Practice Mate-
rials for First Antitrust Institute, Appendix "A" 4-5.
29 Some of the main arguments were: (1) Manufacturers of trademarked items have
a vital interest in the marketing process in order to protect their goodwill. (2) The
discount houses did not provide service and maintenance facilities and franchise
dealers were forced to provide service and repairs pursuant to General Motors' war-
ranties on automobiles which had been purchased from discounters, because of the
latter's inability to do so. (3) Francise dealers have large investments in showrooms,
inventory, service facilities, equipment, parts and accessories, and trained personnel.
(4) Restricted distribution of automobiles actually reduces prices by placing the
dealers in a better position to compete with dealers of other makes of automobiles.
(5) Only intra-brand competition was affected. Protection of the franchise dealers
strengthens them and thereby enhances inter-brand competition. See generally: Brief
for Appellee General Motors Corp.; Brief for Appellees Losor Chevrolet Dealers
Association, Dealers' Service, Inc., and Foothill Chevrolet Dealers Association; Brief
for Amici Curiae; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division II, 75 YALE L. J. 375 (1966); McLaren, Territorial Restrictions,
Exclusive Dealing, and Related Sales Distribution Problems under the Antitrust Laws,
11 PRAC. LAw. 79 (April 1965).
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probably entirely eliminate the distribution system. In conclusion it is
hoped that in the future that the instant case will be treated as sui generis
and the Court's comprehensive language will not be sweepingly applied
to categorize attempts at restricted distribution as per se violations of the
Sherman Act.
Bruce Bauer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BALANCING OF FREE PRESS
AND FAIR TRIAL-INHERENT PREJUDICE FROM
MASS PUBLICITY
In 1954, Dr. Samuel Sheppard was convicted of murdering his wife.
Sensational publicity attended the murder investigation and trial, saturat-
ing the community with prejudice. In addition, it was alleged that the trial
judge's permissive attitude toward the press resulted in disorder in the
courtroom.' In 1964 the United States District Court of Ohio, upon a
writ of habeas corpus, held that Sheppard was not afforded a fair trial. The
Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the failure
of the trial judge to protect the trial from inherent prejudicial publicity
deprived Sheppard of a fair trial consistent with due process. The court-
room lacked the "judicial serenity and calm to which he was entitled."'2
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
The Sheppard case represents a classic example of publicity interfering
with the trial process. There has been a prevalence of such interference in
recent years, due to the development of mass communication media. Pos-
sibly in response to this, the High Court in the Sheppard case sets forth
suggestions for the prevention of prejudice in future trials. This note will
I Sheppard was convicted in 1954 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,
Ohio. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), and the Ohio Supreme
Court, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on the original appeal. 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
Examples of the prejudicial publicity and the trial judge's errors may be enumerated:
a three day televised inquest in which Sheppard's counsel were not allowed to par-
ticipate; articles in all three Cleveland newspapers stressing Sheppard's alleged extra-
marital affairs as a murder motive; repeated criminating statements by law enforcement
personnel; publication in all three Cleveland newspapers of the veniremen and their
addresses, resulting in letters and calls to all of them; the trial judge's permitting a news
table to be set up within the bar and directly in back of counsel table; his failure
to question jurors as to their exposure to news publicity; his failure to sequester the
jury.
2 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,334 (1966). Accord, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
passim (1965).
